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When cultural economists look at the public support for the arts, they dis-
tinguish between two aspects: the positive issue where one analyses the
extent of support by the government, and the normative issue whether or
not the arts should be publicly supported and, if so, to what extent. In the
second case, the cultural economist desires to inform the public about an
appropriate policy, a welfare-enhancing public policy towards the arts.
How does government support the arts?
Throughout history, governments have been heavily involved in the arts.
Table 1 provides an overview of direct public spending on the arts in
various countries in 1994. The table should be interpreted with great care
because what counts as ‘arts expenditure’, and what falls in the domain
of ‘government’, diﬀers considerably between the countries listed.
Nevertheless, the table is able to show widely diﬀerent amounts of direct
public expenditures for the arts. The United States and Ireland spend much
less, and Finland and Germany substantially more, than the other coun-
tries shown in the table. The source of public support also diﬀers widely.
Thus, for example, in Ireland nearly 90 per cent comes from the central
government, while in Germany it is less than 10 per cent, the bulk coming
from the Länder and cities.
It is important to realize that a substantial part of the public support
for the arts is given in an indirect way, by so-called ‘tax deductions’.
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Table 1 Government support for the arts in ten countries, 1994 (direct
spending in dollars per capita)
Australia 24 Ireland 9
Canada 44 Netherlands 48
Finland 112 Sweden 65
France 57 United Kingdom 26
Germany 90 United States 6
Source: Arts Council of England, ‘International Data on Public Spending on the Arts’,
March 1998, reproduced in Heilbrun and Gray (2001, Table 12.1, excerpt).
Individuals’ and ﬁrms’ gifts to the arts may be exempt from tax. Hence, the
higher the applicable (marginal) tax rate, the less costly it is to give to the
arts. It has indeed been observed that a reduction in tax rates led to lower
donations to the arts. The extent of tax expenditure for the arts varies
greatly between countries, and often depends on a great many conditions.
It is therefore impossible to indicate its size, but most cultural economists
assume that it is quite substantial, and often larger (for example for the
United States) than direct expenditures.
There is a basic diﬀerence between the two types of support. In the case
of direct expenditure, the decision about its size and the recipients is taken
in the political sector, often by government bureaucracy. In the case of tax
expenditures, the support decision is delegated to individuals or ﬁrms. This
may lead to a diﬀerent size and type of art being supported.
Many developed economies have constitutional provisions for support-
ing the arts. By necessity, such rules have to be general. The eﬀect on the
arts depends to a great extent on how the political actors and the public oﬃ-
cials apply them. There is considerable evidence that they prefer to support
well established cultural institutions providing generally accepted art, such
as, for instance, opera houses performing popular classical pieces by Verdi,
Mozart, Puccini or Rossini. In contrast, more controversial and experimen-
tal art has diﬃculty in getting public support, because the public decision
makers who depend on public opinion and re-election shun scandals, which
are more likely to be provoked by this kind of art. Indirect aid via tax
expenditures is less subject to such pressures and may bring about the
support of a broader range of artistic activities.
Should government support the arts?
Cultural economics has paid much attention to the question of what the
rationale for the support of the arts could be. The analysis is based on
welfare theory, which focuses on the question of whether the private market
misallocates the resources in the domain of the arts, and in particular why
too little art is provided for if it is left to the price system. It is useful to dis-
tinguish between the demand and the supply side.
Market failures on the demand side
According to welfare economics, too little art is supplied if the markets do
not reﬂect all the preferences of individuals for enjoying art. The following
types of demand are not fully, or only partially, reﬂected on markets:
1. External beneﬁts in production and consumption. The provision of artis-
tic activities may yield beneﬁts, or positive external eﬀects, to individ-
uals and ﬁrms not involved in the production process. They reap a
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beneﬁt for which they do not pay, and which the art producer in a
market therefore does not take into account. Similarly, part of the ben-
eﬁts of artistic production may go to individuals and ﬁrms which do
not pay for such consumption, and which therefore do not inﬂuence
the production decisions on art markets. In both cases, production is
too small compared to what is socially optimal.
2. Non-market demand. People may value the option of visiting an artis-
tic production though, in fact, they never spend any money to actually
attend themselves. People may even know beforehand that they will
never themselves attend an artistic production but they value the exis-
tence of a respective activity. Some people may not themselves value
art, but consider it a bequest for future generations. In many cases,
artistic production is closely identiﬁed with national identity, prestige
and social cohesion. Examples are famous opera houses, theatres,
orchestras and museums. Artistic production may also contribute to a
liberal and broad education and lead to social improvements among the
participants. The experimental nature of (some) artistic endeavours
may foster innovation and risk taking in quite diﬀerent parts of society.
In all these cases, the producers of art are not (fully) compensated in
monetary terms for the beneﬁts created. As a result, they are sometimes
not able to provide the respective cultural activity at all, or only on a
smaller scale than would be socially optimal.
3. Art as a public good. Art may be of a collective nature, in the sense that
nobody (including those not paying) can be excluded from enjoying it,
and that the consumption of one person does not reduce the consump-
tion of other persons. This condition may apply to culture as a whole,
or only some parts of it (for example, the beauty of a cultural city may
be enjoyed by many people without their having to pay speciﬁcally for
such a beneﬁt). In contrast, the cultural consumption provided by, say,
opera houses or museums, is not a public good, because people not
paying may be, and generally are, excluded. Moreover, in these cases
there is rivalry in consumption; those who occupy a seat, or those who
visit a museum, occupy space which is then no longer available to
others. But insofar as culture is a public good, the suppliers are incom-
pletely compensated for their eﬀorts, and supply is lower than socially
optimal.
Not all spillovers to other sectors induced by the arts constitute market
failure. This holds in particular for the multiplier eﬀects generated by
expenditures for the arts. They increase the demand for other economic
activities, such as hotels, restaurants or travel services, and thus work
through the price system. No misallocation of resources is thereby created.
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The many studies of the so-called ‘impact eﬀects’ of cultural activities (such
as, for example, musical festivals or special exhibitions), which measure the
additional economic activity induced, can therefore not be taken as a ratio-
nale for government support of the arts. Such studies, moreover, are often
misplaced, as they indicate the additional turnover created instead of the
added value. They also tend to disregard the alternatives available, that is,
whether, say, a sports event, rather than the cultural activity considered,
would not generate even more economic activity.
On the demand side, further arguments for government support of the
arts relating to aspects beyond eﬃciency may be proposed. Particularly
important ones are the following:
1. Merit goods. Some cultural activities have, from the point of view of
society, been described as being desirable to provide larger quantities
than the individual consumers would wish to purchase in the market.
According to this view, consumer preferences are not to be accepted,
but rather the political decision makers have to decide according to
‘inherent’ worth or to what the majority of the population wants.
Obviously, the idea of merit goods clashes with the basic idea in eco-
nomics that the consumers know best what suits them. In many cases,
‘merit wants’ has just been used as another term for externalities and
public goods connected with the arts.
2. Lack of information. The fact that consumers are often badly informed
about the supply of art has often been used to argue for government
intervention. While the fact can hardly be disputed, it is necessary to
face the question of whether consumers’ limited information is a ratio-
nal consequence of their being little interested in the arts.
3. Irrationality. Individuals may be particularly subject to behavioural
anomalies and paradoxes when they act in the area of culture, because
the area eludes easy and clear deﬁnitions or categorizations. It may be
argued that the individuals therefore underrate the utility provided by
culture. The government should therefore support the arts to make up
for the lack in demand.
4. Income distribution. The consumption of cultural goods should be
open to all classes of society and should not be reserved for the rich.
Consequently, the government should support the arts in order to
make its consumption available to persons who are not able to pay
much money for consuming them.
Market failure on the supply side
The supply of art may deviate in four major respects from the ideals of a
well-functioning market:
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1. Imperfect competition. The market for many cultural goods and ser-
vices is characterized by monopolistic actors who oﬀer smaller quan-
tities at prices higher above marginal costs than competitive suppliers
would. The government might correct this market failure by support-
ing additional supply. However, this argument does not apply to all
areas of the arts. Thus auctions of art objects are an example of an
almost perfectly competitive market.
2. Declining cost. Art supply may be subject to increasing returns to scale,
which means that additional quantities may be produced at lower
average cost. In that case, marginal cost is lower than average cost. The
condition of eﬃcient pricing, namely that price equals marginal cost,
produces a loss. If the government wants to impose marginal cost
pricing, it must support the suppliers by covering the diﬀerence be-
tween marginal and average cost.
3. Productivity lag. Suppliers in the live performing arts are subject to
continuous cost pressure. They ﬁnd it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to
increase labour productivity, but they have to pay similar wage
increases to those in the rest of the economy. As a result, there is a ten-
dency towards continually increasing deﬁcits. In the long run, the per-
forming arts can only supply if the government makes up for these
deﬁcits.
4. Income distribution. Artists tend to be, on average, poorer than other
members of society. Egalitarian arguments may therefore constitute a
reason for government to support persons active in the cultural sector.
Counter-arguments
Some cultural economists committed to free market ideas remain uncon-
vinced that the market failures discussed on the demand and supply side
really exist to any relevant extent. The external eﬀects are claimed to be
small, or even non-existent, or at least not larger than those generated in
many other areas of the economy. There is some truth in this argument. It
is indeed possible to identify some external eﬀects in most economic activ-
ities. However, most cultural economists, on the basis of both theoretical
and empirical considerations, are convinced that cultural activities produce
more extensive and important positive externalities than elsewhere.
The undesired distributional aspects of cultural demand have also been
thrown into doubt. It has been argued, and also in some instances em-
pirically shown, that government support of the arts often achieves the
opposite of what is intended. High-income recipients are the principal con-
sumers of cultural services, so that they are also the main beneﬁciaries of
government support. This has been illustrated by the example of highly
subsidized European opera houses, which are mainly attended by persons
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of above-average incomes, or younger persons (students) who will later in
their lives enjoy above-average incomes (that is, people with above-average
lifetime incomes). While this argument corresponds to the facts, its rele-
vance should not be overestimated. The consumption of artistic goods and
services is certainly not only undertaken by the rich, not least because much
cultural consumption requires considerable time (for instance, an opera
performance takes a whole evening) which, owing to the opportunity costs
of time, is more expensive for high-income recipients. It is in general not the
richest part of the population which beneﬁts from publicly supported art
but the (upper) middle class, which has suﬃcient time available for con-
sumption.
As to the undesired distributional eﬀects on the cultural supply side, it has
been argued that the governmental support tends to favour the successful
and therefore richer artists. This indeed applies to some forms of govern-
ment support. In the case of opera houses, for example, the high subsidies
given by governments help to raise the already high incomes of the most
successful singers and maestros. But it is quite impossible to generalize this
observation. A great part of government support goes to artists with low,
and sometimes very low, lifetime income, and thus works in the desired
direction.
With respect to declining costs and the productivity lag of cultural supply,
it has been claimed that they exist in many other areas of the economy and
that they can be overcome by suitable measures. In particular, revenue can
be raised by introducing prices which capture the rents generated to the
consumers by the cultural activity. Thus price diﬀerentiation enables the
setting of high prices for inframarginal cultural consumers with a high con-
sumer rent, while still setting prices equal to cost for the marginal con-
sumers. Cultural suppliers subject to the ‘cost disease’ have various
possibilities for productivity increases. Productivity can be raised, among
others, by introducing more capital-intensive production, by seeking the
substitution of actors by technological means, by choosing plays with a
smaller number of actors, or by having actors play several roles. Clearly, the
possibilities for a particular performing arts supplier to do so without low-
ering the quality of performance are severely limited. Nevertheless, empir-
ical analyses suggest that they do exist. Moreover, productivity in the live
performing arts may be on the increase owing to indirect eﬀects. Thus, for
example, owing to improved travelling conditions, an actor or a singer may
perform at many more venues than was the case before, which increases his
or her overall productivity. It should also be noted that the productivity lag
only applies to the live performing arts and much less, if at all, to other
forms of the performing arts via television, radio, video or ﬁlm. Indeed,
these other forms constitute an enormous productivity increase in the arts,
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because a given live performance can be extended at very little, and some-
times even zero, cost to large audiences, sometimes even being broadcast to
millions of people.
Cultural producers, faced with high costs relative to revenue, have several
possibilities for avoiding running at a loss. Important ones are to raise
revenue by collateral activities, such as running a shop (within the cultural
venue and outside), a cafeteria and restaurant, renting out the premises for
other activities and seeking support from private and corporate sponsors.
Many art organizations have demonstrated that a great deal of income can
be generated in that way. But it should not be overlooked that the possibil-
ities are severely limited, for several reasons. One is that many art institu-
tions have little scope to engage proﬁtably in such proﬁt-making, most
importantly because they are not glamorous enough to attract suﬃcient
visitors and sponsors. This is the case for many local and regional suppli-
ers, who nevertheless produce worthwhile art. Another reason is that such
proﬁt-oriented activities may threaten the content and quality of art.
Cultural producers should not lose sight of what they stand for, and try to
become ‘entertainers’, not least because they are likely to lose out against
the established entertainment industry. This danger is real; some museums,
for instance, have gone quite far in this direction by continually trying to
feature ‘blockbuster’ exhibitions of doubtful artistic quality which, more-
over, are in many cases also a failure from the commercial point of view.
The proﬁt-making potential is also limited because the cultural suppliers
may thereby lose their non-proﬁt status. This most obviously holds for the
museum shops run outside their premises, say in large shopping centres. If
this status were lost, they would be subject to many additional taxes, and
donations would no longer be exempt from tax. Both consequences would
threaten the very existence of many, if not most, cultural suppliers and
would therefore have counterproductive eﬀects. Clearly, if the ‘private’
opera houses and museums in the United States were no longer classiﬁed
as ‘non-proﬁt-making’, donations would fall drastically and they would
hardly be able to survive.
Comparative view
Even if market failures have been theoretically and empirically identiﬁed for
the arts, they constitute at best a prima facie argument for public support. It
must be taken into account that government intervention is also subject to
failure. The Economics of Politics (Public Choice) discusses many reasons
why the decisions taken in the political process may systematically deviate
from the preferences of the population. Most importantly, politicians are
motivated by the need for re-election rather than by any direct incentive to
provide welfare-maximizing cultural policies. As elections take place only
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every fourth or ﬁfth year, they are only insuﬃciently controlled by the voters.
They tend to develop into a political class of their own and to a consider-
able extent decide according to their own taste to what extent, and how,
culture is to be supported. Political failures are also introduced by the beha-
viour of the public bureaucracy which, because of its informational advan-
tages, has large discretionary power to undertake a cultural policy of its
liking. At the same time, both politicians and public oﬃcials are exposed to
the inﬂuence of pressure groups. As a result, they tend to favour those cul-
tural suppliers who are well organized, which in most cases boils down to
concentrating the funds on a few large and well-established cultural suppli-
ers (such as opera houses, national theatres and orchestras). In contrast,
new, unorthodox and experimental art suppliers ﬁnd it diﬃcult to get much
public aid, which tends to hamper creativity in the arts.
To gain a balanced view, it is necessary to compare the extent of market
and political failure with respect to cultural issues.
Constitutional issues for and against the public support of the arts
The arguments so far presented in favour of or against publicly supporting
the arts are informed by the notion of market and political failure, respec-
tively. But it can be argued that the world is imperfect. The idea of failure
compared to an ideal situation is then of little relevance, because the whole
economy and society is dominated by failures. According to this view, it
does not make sense to identify the extent to which the cultural sector devi-
ates from ideal market, or political conditions, as (nearly) all sectors in
society do so to a signiﬁcant extent. A more useful approach is to compare
the sectors directly with each other. The question then becomes whether the
cultural sector receives more or less public support than other sectors, and
whether such support improves the lot of the population. The ﬁrst part of
the question is easy to answer: the cultural sector does receive considerable
support from the government but it is tiny compared to that of other
sectors, such as agriculture, education, transport or defence. The second
part of the question cannot be answered directly, at least as long as it is
agreed that there is no such thing as a collective social welfare function,
which would enable us to evaluate and compare the performance of the
various sectors. While such an evaluation is not possible in an empirically
relevant way, the issue can be successfully approached by moving to the
constitutional level of analysis. The support of a sector by the public must
be subjected to a generally accepted decision process. In a democracy, such
support must be approved by the citizens. In a representative democracy,
the decisions taken by a duly elected parliament and government are taken
as legitimate, even if they are not perfect. In a democracy with direct par-
ticipation rights of the population via popular referenda (as in various
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states of the USA, in Australia and Switzerland), the voting outcome to
speciﬁc propositions, and the corresponding level of support for the arts, is
taken as legitimate.
Empirical research indicates that the citizens are very willing to support
the arts with substantial funds if asked to decide in referenda. The fear
sometimes raised that the population is not able to judge issues connected
with culture, and will therefore reject the support of the arts by public
means, ﬁnds no justiﬁcation at all. In the case of both types of democracy,
by implication, whatever has been decided in the political process, with
respect to the support of the arts and other sectors, must be assumed to
fulﬁl the wishes of the population. In contrast, when the democratic
process is violated, or when the decision process is taken in an authoritar-
ian or dictatorial way, the public support for the arts (or for any other sector
for that matter) does not reﬂect the wishes of the population. In that case,
the art supported conforms to what the people in political power consider
to be ‘art’. Only in the case of highly cultured rulers (an example are the
Medici in Italy of the Renaissance) will the art publicly supported be of
lasting value. In the other cases, the activities of ‘artists’ who produce for
the beneﬁt of the authoritarian rulers are promoted (an example is the
socialist realism promoted by Stalin).
An important constitutional decision concerning the public support of
art refers to whether decision making is centralized or takes place in a
federal system of government. In the latter case, art suppliers do not solely
depend on one public authority but can try out their ideas on several public
donors. This raises the possibility and incentives for innovative art.
See also:
Chapter 2: Applied welfare economics; Chapter 48: Principal–agent analysis; Chapter 49:
Public choice; Chapter 57: Tax concessions, Chapter 61: Welfare economics.
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